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6. Santa Clara Valley Transportation Authority,
124 Cal. App. 4th 346, 2004 Cal. PUC LEXIS 1973 (November 22, 2004).
The Court of Appeal (Sixth District) held that Sections 1201 and 1202 of the Public Utilities Code, granting the Commission jurisdiction over railroad crossings, did not apply to Petitioner, a public agency providing passenger rail service. Even though the statutes at issue could be characterized as of the type the Legislature intended the Commission to enforce, the court accorded no deference to the Commission’s interpretation of the statutes, choosing instead to subject the Commission’s interpretation to “independent review.” Since the question before the court was one of jurisdiction, the Court’s choice is not particularly surprising (See Para. 10, infra). But, the opinion did not rest its election to conduct an expressly independent review (instead of applying Greyhound9 deference) on the jurisdictional nature of the question. Instead, the court suggested that greater deference was due to agency construction of a statute only where that construction was embraced in a quasi legislative act authorized by the Legislature (such as promulgating a regulation). This holding seems to represent a departure from the broad deference found in decisions out of the Second District (See e.g. Para. 11).10 (The Commission unsuccessfully sought review of the SCVTA Order in the California Supreme Court.) To date, SCVTA and Edison (below) are the only two Courts of Appeal decisions with respect to which the Commission has sought review in the California Supreme Court.

9 See Para. 11, infra.
10 Whatever departure SCVTA may represent from state law regarding deference to agency interpretation of a statute, it seems consistent with present federal law as articulated by the Ninth Circuit. See Natural Resources Defense Council v. National Marine Fisheries Service, 421 F. 3d 872 (August 24, 2005). (Part II of the Court’s opinion discusses Chevron deference (See fn. 17, infra) as construed by the United States Supreme Court’s later decision in U.S. v. Mead, 513 U.S. 218 (2001).) A full reading of SCVTA suggests that the deference accorded the Commission was tantamount to that afforded federal agencies under the Skidmore standard, i.e., not deference, but a level of “respect” based on the persuasiveness of the agency decision. Indeed, even the original Chevron decision seemed to differentiate between (1) explicit grants of rulemaking authority, and (2) only implicit authority to “fill-in gaps.” The U.S. Supreme Court recently affirmed the distinction in Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006), 2006 U.S. LEXIS 767, the Oregon case involving physician-assisted suicide.